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Abstract A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media
(e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). In this paper, we study its role in mobilization.
We assume that social media allow potential participants to observe the individual
participation decisions of others, while traditional mass media allow potential par-
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ticipants to see only the total number of people who participated before them. We
show that when individuals’ willingness to revolt is publicly known, then both sorts
of media foster a successful revolution. However, when willingness to revolt is private
information, only social media ensure that a revolt succeeds, with mass media multiple
outcomes are possible, one of which has individuals not participating in the revolt.
This suggests that social media enhance the likelihood that a revolution triumphs more
than traditional mass media.
“We use Facebook to schedule protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.”
Anonymous Cairo Activist
1 Introduction
Coordination failures occur when individuals do not act in unison to achieve an
outcome that would benefit them. Examples include, among others, poverty traps,
economic cycles or inefficient conventions (Masiliu¯nas 2017; Cooper and John 1988;
Adsera and Ray 1998; Morris 2014). In these settings, individuals may benefit from
choosing an action that changes the status quo, but it would require the coordina-
tion of a sufficient number of individuals to do so. Revolutions are also akin to these
setups. Citizens that protest might change a bad regime if the number of participants
is above a certain threshold. One issue to be considered is that part of the population
might be unwilling to participate in the revolt. In this paper, we look at the effect of
communication technology (mass or social media) to overthrow a dictator when the
majority wants to change the regime, but there is heterogeneity of types and part of
the population is unwilling to change the status quo.
In the last years, there have been many mass mobilizations that attracted con-
siderable public attention internationally. The mass protests that started the uprisings
against the regimes in the Arab world, the demonstrations of the Indignados movement
in Spain, the Occupy Wall Street movement or the Hong Kong’s Umbrella revolution
are the most prominent examples. A distinguishing feature of these events was the
omnipresence of social media (especially, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). Many
scholars (e.g. Castells 2011; Edmond 2013; Manacorda and Tesei 2016; Enikolopov
et al. 2016) wonder how these new information technologies affect social movements.
Do they help to overthrow autocratic regimes more easily than the former technology?
Social media affect the evolution of protests in various ways. First, social media
provide access to alternative information about the true state of the economy and
the government’s performance. This information may be limited under mass media,
especially when the government controls it. Social media help to inform audiences
around the world about the unfolding of the events, attracting international attention
and provoking diplomatic pressure. Finally, social media offer an easy, quick and
inexpensive means of communication that facilitates the spread of information among
the participants. This, in turn, may help to foster coordination, a key factor to achieve
the goals of any movement. One interesting insight along these lines is one by Daron
Acemoglu. When asked about overthrowing dictators he pointed out the following: “It
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is a question of coordinating people’s beliefs, I need to know if other people agree with
me and are willing to act. What really stops people who are oppressed by a regime
from protesting is the fear that they will be part of an unsuccessful protest. When you
are living in these regimes, you have to be extremely afraid of what happens if you
participate and the regime doesn’t change.”1 Descriptions of the recent revolutions
seem to highlight the importance of social media in efficient mobilization. Individuals
fear that not enough people will go to the protests, so uncertainty about the turnout is
a major obstacle. When mass media (e.g., TV or radio) report about attendance, then
the audience does not know the reasons why individuals did not go. In social media
these reasons can be revealed. For instance, Ghonim (2012) mentions the existence
of opinion polls online to find out why people decided (not) to go to the protest. The
comments on Facebook help also to get insight into the decision-making of others
and serve to raise spirits. Ghonim describes that he was surprised to see among the
supporters persons that he did not expect to see. All this together helps to “break the
barrier of fear” (Ghonim 2012) and allows individuals know that they are enough and
together they can bring down the dictator.
Although social media seem to have a notable effect on mobilizing the masses, we
lack a formal model that attempts to capture its effects on mobilization. In this paper,
we use game theory to show how this technology may help to change the status quo in
an autocratic regime. Our starting point is that willingness to participate in the protests
depends on the perceived costs and benefits of participation. Arguably, heading out
onto the streets implies the costs of facing tear gas, rubber bullets and potential arrest
and incarceration. Benefits involve the perceived gains in participating in an uprising
that may bring about a better future, provided it succeeds. The probability of success
is highly related to the number of participants. Yet, when a potential protester decides
whether to participate, possibly she has only a vague idea about if sufficient other
people will participate. Different types of media may affect these beliefs (and the
resulting mobilization) in diverse ways.
To investigate the effects of social media on mobilization, we study how individuals’
decisions to participate in the revolution are affected by two different communication
technologies: mass and social media. We posit that when an individual obtains infor-
mation through mass media then she gets to know the actual state of the revolution
in that moment, whereas when informed via social media she is able to observe the
sequence of decisions leading up to that state. For instance, when searching in Twitter
the individual gets the last conversations about the topic, and by scrolling down the
page she is able to see all previous tweets about it, the use of hashtags indeed facil-
itates this task. In Facebook, the users may comment on the events and all previous
comments can be read. When people chat in a group with Whatsapp, the complete
talk is recorded in the smartphone of each participant. We suppose that tweets, chats
and comments are informative about the individuals’ decision to join the protests or
1 The New York Times, February 17, 2011, “Web Solutions Applied to the Problem of Toppling Autocrats”,
retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/americas/18iht-letter18.html?_r=0 on July 14,
2014. Manacorda and Tesei (2016) posit a similar argument and discuss the possible benefits of information:
“Knowledge, albeit imperfect, of others’ likelihood of participating can, in particular, foster individuals’
willingness to participate, and lead to the emergence of protests in equilibrium, an outcome that would not
result in a world where individuals act atomistically.” (page 3).
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to stay at home. As stated by participants in the Hong Kong’s Umbrella revolution, “If
your friends ask you to join the protest, they just Whatsapp you: ‘Hey, I am going, are
you?’ Then you quickly decide.” (Parker 2014). By contrast, when TV or radio inform
about the state of a given event, the precise history remains hidden, only aggregate
information about the turnout is reported.2
We rely on these distinctive features of mass and social media and model the prob-
lem of revolution as a coordination problem. We suppose that there are two groups in
the society. One of them consists of individuals who want to overthrow the dictator
(willing individuals). The another one is composed of individuals who do not want
to change the regime but prefer the status quo (unwilling individuals). We assume
that there are enough willing individuals to bring about a change and overthrow-
ing the dictator is the socially efficient outcome. That is, if all willing individuals
revolt, then the dictator is toppled. However, if the number of protesters (those will-
ing individuals who actually head onto the streets) falls short of a critical mass, then
the dictator remains in power and may punish those who participated in the failed
revolt.
We assume that individuals choose in sequence whether or not to revolt. Before
making her decision, each individual is informed about the state of the revolution. The
information that an individual receives depends on the communication technology.
As discussed above, mass media allow individuals to learn how many people have
already chosen to participate (i.e. the actual state of the revolution), whereas individ-
uals observe each of the past decisions (e.g. the precise history) when information is
channeled through social media.
First, we show that when the type of individuals (that is, if she is willing to revolt
or not) is public information, willing individuals take part in the revolution in case of
both communication technologies and, thus, the dictator is overthrown. Interestingly
enough, it is not necessarily the case when there is no communication technology and
thus individuals receive no information about the state of the revolution. If willing
individuals believe that other willing individuals will not revolt, then it is possible to
have an equilibrium outcome where nobody revolts. This, in turn, shows that the mere
existence of communication technologies (i.e., mass or social media) can facilitate that
social movements achieve their objective by shrinking the set of beliefs, compared with
the case in which no information is disclosed.
Second, we study a more realistic setup in which the type of individuals is not
observed (i.e. it is private information). Although it is common knowledge in our
model that there are enough willing individuals in the society to change the regime,
the type of communication technology becomes relevant in this setup. We show that
mass media do not necessarily enable willing individuals to organize themselves effi-
ciently. Thus, depending on the perceived costs and benefits, willing individuals might
choose not to revolt in equilibrium. However, successful revolution is the unique
equilibrium outcome when individuals use social media, independently of the sever-
ity of punishment that protesters may suffer if they fail to overthrow the dictator.
2 There are features of social media that foster spreading information quickly and to a wide audience.
For instance in the case of Twitter “retweeting” allows to repost a content referencing to the source of the
content; “trending topic” highlights content that an in-built algorithm considers collectively relevant.
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This result shows that communication through social media facilitates that revolu-
tions succeed more than when communication is channeled through traditional mass
media.
Although our comparison of mass and social media suggests that they are competing
communication technologies, our results are aimed at answering the question about
how social media enhance mass media’s ability to mobilize individuals. The results
gleaned from the empirical evidence support the idea that citizens perceived social
media to be very important during the Arab Spring (Howard et al. 2011; Lang and De
Sterck 2014), including the Tunisian revolution (Marzouki et al. 2012) or the protests
in Egypt (Attia et al. 2011; Azab 2012; Lim 2012; Tufekci and Wilson 2012). Hence,
microblogging activity (Qin et al. 2016) or the amount of tweets (Acemoglu et al.
2014; Steinert-Threlkeld et al. 2015) might have been related to the incidence and
the intensity of protests. There is indeed a causal relationship between social media
and mobilization according to Manacorda and Tesei (2016) and Enikolopov et al.
(2016). Manacorda and Tesei (2016) study how coverage of mobile phone signals
affected the occurrence of protest and individual participation on the whole African
continent between 1998 and 2012.3 They show that mobile phones promoted protests
and helped mass mobilization during economic downturn. Enikolopov et al. (2016)
show that the penetration of VK, the dominant Russian online social network, affected
protest participation in a series of protest during 2011. More concretely, a 10% increase
in penetration increased the probability of a protest by almost 5% and the number of
participants by roughly 20%.
Section 2 reviews briefly the relevant literature. Section 3 presents our model. We
derive our theoretical results in Sect. 4, where we also discuss the application of our
model, by presenting two examples in which we assess the differences between mass
and social media in yielding different outcomes in a revolution. We discuss some
caveats of our model and possible extensions in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes. All the
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Literature review
In this section first we show why observability of actions and social networks (that are
the basis of social media) are important in the evolution of revolts. Then we go over
the most relevant and recent theoretical papers on revolutions and the corresponding
literature on coordination games.
Our interpretation of the process why an individual joins a protests follows the
rationalist view that the citizens assess the costs and benefits of participating in a
revolt (see, for instance, Goldstone 2001 and the references therein).4 Social networks
play an important role at several stages of the process. Passy (2003) claims that social
media create social networks that are important in community creation, in connecting
3 The authors point out that in Africa there is a lack of fixed phone line and high-speed Internet cabling,
so generally mobile phones provide the access to the Internet and social media.
4 There are other views on protests that emphasize the role of identity and social-psychological factors
(see for instance, Klandermans 1984). In revolts, both rational and non-rational elements play a role, in this
paper we focus on the former ones.
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the prospective participants and also in the decision-making, since individuals use the
information coming from the social network to anticipate and evaluate the potential
costs and outcome of participation. Gunitsky (2015) and Battaglini (2017) highlight
also the effects of social media in allowing individuals to communicate their informa-
tion. Importantly, the decision to join the revolution depends also on the intentions and
action of other participants. If many other citizens are expected to join, then the revo-
lution is likely to succeed and this makes participation more attractive. In the opposite
case, staying at home may be the optimal decision. Both mass and social media enable
individuals to form beliefs about the turnout at the protest. Our approach aims to show
that social media promote better mobilization, because from an individual’s point of
view they give more accurate information about previous decisions and they allow that
subsequent individuals observe the decision. The fact that decisions can be observed
and may affect the behavior of others relates our work to models of informational
influence; i.e., herding and informational cascades (e.g., Banerjee 1992; Bikhchan-
dani et al. 1992, 1998). However, in these models there is a clear best choice (e.g.,
which restaurant or product is better) and individuals have some private information
about it. Individuals update their signals upon observing the decision of others, thus
it may be rational to follow others to choose the payoff-maximizing alternative. In
our setting, there is heterogeneity of types in that willing and unwilling individuals
have different preferences. Relevant to our setting, willing individuals should revolt
in equilibrium only if the revolution turns out to be successful, thus a coordination
problem is embedded in our framework. These features make our paper divert from
the literature on informational influence.
Turning to theoretical models of revolutions, a common point in most of these papers
is that the regime can be overthrown if enough citizens participate in an uprising. The
studies differ mainly in (i) what types of individuals they assume, (ii) if the individuals
have different willingness to revolt, (iii) the channels of coordination (e.g., what can
be observed?), and (iv) the regime’s role. De Mesquita (2010) assumes the existence
of a vanguard, a continuum of citizens with varying antigovernment sentiment and
a passive regime. It is a pure coordination game with simultaneous moves after the
vanguard chose the level of costly violence. The vanguard uses violence and it is
informative about the discontent in the society and individuals sensing the increased
dissatisfaction are more likely to join the revolution.5 Individuals do not observe other
individuals’ decision to join the protest, therefore the role of media is disregarded
in this model, which has multiple equilibria: with and without successful regime
change. Chwe (2000) is the closest paper to ours in spirit. He assumes two types
of individuals: willing (those who want change and are ready to go to the streets)
and unwilling (those who stay at home). In his model, the social network allows
individuals to communicate their private type (e.g., Gunitsky 2015; Battaglini 2017).
Chwe characterizes the minimal sufficient networks that make coordination feasible
among willing individuals, regardless on the prior beliefs about the willingness of the
others. He shows the importance of cliques (a subset of individuals where everybody is
5 Barbera and Jackson (2016) argue that demonstrations may help in providing information to enable
revolutions. See also Ginkel and Smith (1999) for a model in which a group of willing individuals choose
whether or not to revolt before the mass public.
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linked to everybody else). In our setting the main difficulty comes from what a willing
individual believes when observing that somebody stays at home (i.e., she can be an
unwilling individual who does not want to change the regime or a willing individual
that prefers not to revolt). Our approaches differ in that we do not allow individuals
communicate their willingness to participate using the network, but to observe the
action of others. Chwe (2000) also looks at the minimal sufficient network for the
revolution to succeed, while we assume that the network is complete and study how
different sorts of information (mass vs. social media) might help to overthrow the
dictator.6 Ellis and Fender (2011) is also akin to our approach in that observing other
individuals’ behavior is possible. This helps to make inferences about the information
that other individuals have about the state of the world. The revolution is successful
if an information cascade forms and poor agents rebel. We do not have a herding
model as Ellis and Fender (2011) and contrary to their model individuals in our setup
revolt only if they can be sure that the uprising will succeed. Edmond (2013) studies
the revolution also as a coordination game in a global games framework. Citizens are
ex ante identical and then they receive noisy signals about the regime’s strength from
several media outlets, but not about the decisions of other citizens. Lang and De Sterck
(2014) show that mobilization is successful only if protesters are enthusiastic enough
and their action is visible.
In the previous papers, revolution is modeled as a coordination problem that might
be overcome in different ways. In the models without observing other citizens’ deci-
sions (De Mesquita 2010; Edmond 2013) observing correlated signals makes a revolt
potentially successful. In the models where observing other individuals plays a role
(Ellis and Fender 2011; Lang and De Sterck 2014) there is only one type of individuals
and if enough of them decide to revolt, then the dictator is overthrown. Our model
attempts to capture the uncertainty involved in mobilization, resorting to unwilling
individuals whose choice is always the same. Arguably, their presence makes coor-
dination difficult, since a willing individual who observes somebody staying at home
does not know if it is due to an unwilling citizen or a willing one who decided not
to participate in the revolt. This feature makes our paper divert from the literature
on global games (Carlsson and Van Damme 1993; Morris and Shin 2003; Angeletos
et al. 2007) where introducing (and not removing) some uncertainty might help in
efficiently resolving the multiple equilibria problem, yielding a unique equilibrium
prediction.
3 The model
We study in a model how different communication technologies determine the out-
come of a revolt. Suppose a finite set of individuals, N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a dictator.
Each individual chooses an action ai ∈ {r, s} where r means “revolt” and s “stay at
home”. Each individual i is either of type τi = w (willing to revolt) or τi = x (unwill-
6 The network structure in Chen et al. (2016) is such that individuals receive information about about the
strength of the regime, and then communicate to each other the informativeness of the rumor. Kiss et al.
(2016) is also related to Chwe (2000) in that they look at the minimal sufficient network, but in line with
our modeling choice they assume that the network allows for the observability of actions.
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ing). Willing individuals are ready to participate in protests, unwilling individuals are
reluctant to do so. We denote by W the amount of individuals that are willing to revolt,
i.e., #{i : τi = w} = W , where W ∈ (0, n).
Individuals decide in a sequence. Let the type vector τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn) denote
the sequence of individuals.7 The set of sequences of length n with W willing citizens
is given by
ϒn,W = {τ : #{τ j ∈ τ : τ j = w} = W }.
There are
(
n
W
)
possible type vectors and any of them is selected with equal proba-
bility.8
We suppose that the index of the individual (i ∈ N ) corresponds to her position
in the sequence of decisions. The utility of each individual i depends on her type and
the outcome of the revolution. The revolution is successful if at least t individuals
decide to revolt (i.e., #{ j ∈ N : a j = r} ≥ t), otherwise the dictator will remain
in power. We follow De Mesquita (2010) and assume that the value of the threshold
is common knowledge.9 We consider the case in which W ≥ t and W is common
knowledge, so that individuals know that there are sufficient people willing to revolt.10
Changing the regime is assumed to be the socially efficient outcome (as it will also
be clear from the payoffs). Although it is common knowledge that there are sufficient
willing individuals in the society to change the regime, and overthrowing the dictator
is efficient, the change requires coordination. This, in turn, depends on the individuals’
expected costs and benefits of participating in the revolt.
Let ai be the action chosen by individual i and let a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) be the
profile of actions. A willing individual that decides to stay at home (ai = s) will
receive utility uw,s . If the willing individual decides to participate in the revolt, the
utility will depend on whether the revolt succeeds (uw,r,R) or fails (uw,r,F ), where
uw,r,R > uw,s > uw,r,F is assumed.11 In words, willing individuals’ utility is highest
when they participate in a successful revolution (uw,r,R). If they stay at home, they
derive less utility (uw,s), although the smallest utility is derived when individuals take
part in a revolution that is defeated. The payoff uw,r,F can then be interpreted as the
7 Abusing somewhat the notation, τ denotes a sequence of individuals, but also the set of individuals in the
sequence.
8 This, in turn, implies that we study any possible configuration that may occur in equilibrium in a pre-
game, in which individuals have to choose when to decide. We are not aware of any paper that studies how
the sequence of decision in a revolt is determined. We discuss this issue in Sect. 5.
9 Schelling (1978) and Granovetter (1978) use models with individual thresholds to study problems that
involve collective action. In Edmond (2013) or Angeletos et al. (2007) there is uncertainty about the
threshold. In Chwe (2000) each person has an individual threshold.
10 If W < t , then it is clear that individuals do not revolt in equilibrium.
11 Note that in the utilities, the first subscript refers to the type of the individual, the second to the action
that she undertakes, whereas the third one indicates the outcome. R represents a successful revolution, while
F denotes that it has failed.
123
Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach. . .
punishment that the dictator imposes on protesters who participate in a revolution that
fails, suffering this punishment being the potential cost of participation.12
We assume that unwilling individuals will not participate in the revolt (whatever
reasons they might have). The utility of an unwilling individual that revolts (ux,r ) is
therefore assumed to be smaller that the utility of an unwilling individual that stays at
home (ux,s). This, in turn, implies that it is always optimal for an unwilling individ-
ual to stay at home. Interestingly, the presence of these individuals complicates the
coordination among willing individuals. A willing individual who observes somebody
staying at home does not know if it is due to an unwilling citizen or a willing one who
decided not to participate in the revolt.
Given our payoffs, the first best is achieved when willing individuals coordinate and
overthrow the dictator. The reason is that unwilling individuals’ utility is not affected
by the outcome of the revolt, whereas willing individuals are better off if the uprising
is successful.
Our paper is an attempt to show how different communication technologies may
affect the outcome of the revolution. Individuals decide in sequence whether or not to
revolt and they have information about past decisions that is available to individuals
depending on the communication technology as follows:
• No technology Individuals do not have any information on previous choices when
deciding.
• Mass media technology Individuals have aggregate information about the actions
that have been already taken (e.g., number of predecessors that decided to revolt and
stay at home). This represents a situation in which individuals obtain information
through radio or television about the state of the revolution before making their
own decision.
• Social media technology Individuals observe the individual action of each prede-
cessor. This means that individual i knows exactly which action was chosen by
each of her i − 1 predecessors. This represents a situation in which individuals
obtain information through Facebook or Twitter (or any other social media), in
which individuals may observe the exact history of previous decisions.
To formalize the different communication technologies, let ϕi denote the infor-
mation that individual i has. When no communication technology is available, then
ϕi = {τi }; i.e., individuals only know their own types, but nothing about other indi-
viduals’ decisions. Mass media technology implies ϕi = {τi , ρi , i − ρi − 1} where
ρi represents the number of individuals who have decided to revolt up to individual
i (ρi = #{a j = r, j < i}); i.e., individuals know the amount of predecessors who
decided to participate in the revolt, and then the number of individuals who decided
to stay at home. In the spirit of Lohmann (1993, 1994a, b) we assume that each previ-
12 The utility of staying at home may depend on whether the revolution triumphs or not. A successful
revolt may bring better life to a willing individual who by staying at home avoids the costs of the revolution.
Thus, there may be free-riding issues at stake as well (see for instance Lohmann 1993). Although these are
interesting questions (and promising venues of future research), we deliberately disregard this issue to focus
on the coordination problem embedded in the above payoffs. In this regard, our payoffs generate a game
that resembles the classic stag-hunt situation, although the presence of unwilling individuals complicates
the analysis.
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ous decision (ordered according to the position) is observed under social media. The
available information then is ϕi = {τi , {a j ,∀ j < i}}.
In Fig. 1, we depict a reduced extensive-form representation of the game generated
by each communication technology in a simple society of n = 4 individuals in which
W = 3 of them are willing to revolt. We name it reduced form because we have
simplified the representation by drawing only one of the four branches that would
follow each of the type vectors. At the beginning of the game, nature selects at random
one of them. In the four possible type vectors willing citizens are represented by
black circles and the unwilling one by a white circle. We assume that individuals only
observe actions but not types, so individuals are represented by grey circles in the rest
of the tree.13 We derive in Sect. 4 the theoretical predictions of our model both when
types are observed and when they are private information.
At the top of Fig. 1, we represent the case without communication technology in
which the individuals decide without knowing the decisions of their predecessors (i.e.,
they only know the position, but nothing else). As a result, all nodes at a given position
belong to the same information set. Then, we depict the case of mass media, in which
individuals only know the number of predecessors that already revolt. For instance,
imagine that the fourth individual is informed that two individuals have chosen to
revolt (and, consequently, one stayed at home). She is not able to distinguish if the
sequence was (r, r, s), (r, s, r) or (s, r, r), hence the information that the individual
has is compatible with three possible sequences of decisions. Finally, we draw at the
bottom of Fig. 1 the case of social media, in which individuals are able to identify
perfectly the sequence of decisions; i.e., the information sets are singletons.14
Note that the game becomes more sequential as we move from the case without
communication towards social media. In principle, the effect of more information is
ambiguous. More information may be good for revolution since it allows individuals
to make their actions more visible to the subsequent citizens; but at the same time,
it could also foster coordination failure, e.g. if individuals find out that too many of
their predecessors have chosen not to participate in the revolution. Note that they may
observe many individuals staying at home because those observed citizens were the
unwilling ones.
4 Revolutions under different information structures
This section derives three different predictions of our model. The first one shows
that there are multiple equilibria when no communication technology is available,
therefore it is possible to have the inefficient outcome in which individuals decide
not to revolt. We highlight the importance of mass and social media in Sects. 4.1
and 4.2, where we show that willing individuals will revolt in the presence of any of
13 In Appendix C we represent the complete decision tree for the social media case. Note that in our model
the social network is assumed to be complete. Siegel shows in several papers how in general the structure
of the social network affects participation in collective action (Siegel 2009), the effect of repression on
collective action (Siegel 2011) and how it interacts with mass media (Siegel 2013). Importantly, none of
these papers studies the effect of different sorts of media on participation in revolts.
14 Recall, however, that types are not observable in the present setting.
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Fig. 1 Reduced extensive-form representation of a society with n = 4 and W = 3
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the two communication technologies when types are public information. If types are
unobservable, however, there are equilibria in which willing individuals decide not to
revolt under mass media, whereas revolution will always succeed under social media.
The case without technology is our benchmark scenario. Our first result shows
that when information about other individuals is not available (i.e., when decisions
are taken without knowing what other individuals have done) the efficient outcome
in which individuals revolt may fail to materialize, even if it is known that sufficient
willing individuals exist.
Proposition 1 If no communication technology is available in the society, there are
multiple equilibria.
This is in line with the usual result of multiplicity of equilibria in coordination
problems. Since uw,r,R > uw,s > uw,r,F , for the willing individuals it is optimal
to revolt if the other willing individuals are revolting, while it is optimal to stay at
home if nobody else is revolting. If a willing individual believes that the other willing
individuals will participate in the revolution, then she best responds to this belief by
participating as well. However, if they hold the opposite belief, then staying at home
is the best response. In fact, there are two symmetric equilibria: one in which all
willing individuals participate in the revolution; and another one in which no willing
individual goes to the streets.
The previous result does not depend on whether type is a public information or not.
However, when a communication technology is available this distinction becomes
relevant as shown next.
4.1 Type is public information
It is instructive to see how the existence of information affects the outcome of revolts
in a perfect information setup in which the willingness to revolt (that is, the type of
individuals) is transmitted by the communication technology. In this setting, an indi-
vidual who observes an action will know whether a willing or an unwilling individual
took it. This can be the case, for instance, when the people willing to overthrow the
dictator belong to the same social group (e.g. religious association, ethnic groups or
social classes), so that individuals know the type of the people who have decided pre-
viously. For example, in Egypt the youth in general was unsatisfied with the regime,
and so were also the Copts.
We model this situation by introducing the type of the predecessors in the infor-
mation available to each individual. More specifically, the available information is
ϕi = {τi , ρi , i − ρi − 1, Wi } in the case of mass media, where Wi denotes the amount
of willing individuals up to (but excluding) individual i , that have already decided.15
As for social media, the assumption about publicly observed types implies that the
15 This is a valuable information since it also reveals how many willing individuals are left to decide. For
instance, if there were many willing individuals who abstained from participating in the protests, then it is
more probable that the total number of protesters will fall short of the threshold, so staying at home may
be the best response.
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information of individual i becomes ϕi = {τi , {a j ,∀ j < i}, {τ j ,∀ j < i}}. In this
setting, both the type and decision of each preceding individual are observed.
Individual i’s strategy is conditioned on the available information. It is defined as
σi : ϕi → {r, s}. Let  = {r, s}n be the game’s strategy space, and let σ ∈  be a
strategy profile, that is, σ = (σ1, . . . , σn). Let hi be the history of decisions before
individual i , hi = {a1, . . . , ai−1}.
We find that given a type vector the unique subgame perfect equilibrium with the
two communication technologies is the one in which the revolution succeeds, and
every willing individual chooses to revolt. In this case, both technologies generate the
same behavior in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If type is public information, every willing individual revolts in any
subgame perfect equilibrium under both communication technologies.
Proof See Appendix A. unionsq
The rationale for this result is that a willing individual chooses to join the revo-
lution if she observes that already t − 1 individuals have revolted. Given this fact, a
willing individual who observes t − 2 people participating in the revolution decides
to revolt if she knows that after her there is at least one more willing individual. Since
predecessors’ types are publicly observable, she can infer if there is a willing indi-
vidual behind her. Iterating this reasoning, a willing individual decides to revolt when
up to her sufficient willing individuals have chosen to do so and she anticipates that
enough willing citizens behind her will follow suit. The conditions ensuring that this
requirement is met at any position imply that all willing citizens choose to participate
in the revolution.
As commented above, our assumption on predecessors’ type being public informa-
tion is plausible in environments where the people willing to overthrow the dictator can
be associated to particular groups. Under these circumstances, it is likely that when
individuals acquire information they know both the actions and the types of those
who have already decided. In this case, the existence of any of the communication
technologies guarantees that the revolution triumphs in our simplified environment.
Arguably, the uncertainty about how many individuals would participate in a revo-
lution is the main barrier and it makes most of the individuals who are discontented
to stay at home. This uncertainty comes—at least partly—from the uncertainty about
types that we consider next.
4.2 Type is private information
We study now the case where type is private information. Given the untrust and fear
generated by dictators in repressive regimes, however, types cannot be observed, what
makes the setup more plausible. As argued by several authors (e.g. Ginkel and Smith
1999; Kuran 1991, 1995), decision making in any revolution is clouded by a consid-
erable amount of uncertainty. This uncertainty blurs the information about the public
discontent due to several reasons, e.g. the lack of free press, falsified preference rev-
elation to official public opinion polls or the presence of informants penetrating all
layers of the society, among others.
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When type is private information, communication technologies only transmit to
individuals the actions of predecessors. For the mass media technology, the informa-
tion of individual i becomes ϕi = {τi , ρi , i −ρi −1}, so the amount of citizens of each
type who have already decided is not known. In the case of social media, citizen i’s
information is given by ϕi = {τi , {a j ,∀ j < i}}. Hence, citizen i cannot distinguish
perfectly the type of her predecessors although she knows the exact sequence of deci-
sions. Remember that observing that somebody revolts indicates unambiguously that
she is of the willing type, since unwilling citizens always stay at home. However, since
willing individuals may choose to stay at home, observing that someone has chosen
not to participate in the revolt does not imply that she is unwilling.
Since types cannot be observed, we look for Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The fol-
lowing proposition highlights the importance of the communication technology. We
find that under social media being truthful is the unique equilibrium profile; therefore,
staying at home when an individual is unwilling and revolting when she is willing is
the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. With mass media the revolution succeeds only
when certain conditions are met.
Proposition 3 Consider the case where type is private information. Under the social
media technology, the revolution always succeeds because each willing individual
revolts in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under the mass media technology,
• if t < [ n
n−W+1
] + 1, each willing individual revolts and the revolution succeeds;
• if t ≥ [ n
n−W+1
] + 1, there are equilibria where the revolution is unsuccessful and
nobody revolts for certain values of uw,r,R; uw,s and uw,r,F .
Proof See Appendix B. unionsq
The logic behind our result is that “identifications of types” is possible under social
media, but not under mass media. More specifically, any individual that observes a
history of decisions under social media knows that all willing (unwilling) predecessors
decided to protest (revolt) in equilibrium. With mass media, there may be situations in
which willing individuals find it optimal to stay at home, thus a citizen that observes a
history of decisions will only revolt if she is sure that there are enough willing to revolt
behind her. Hence, a willing individual that observes t −2 revolts will always revolt in
the case of social media (even if only one individual is left to decide). This is because
the individual that observes t − 2 protests can infer the types of the predecessors and
knows that there is (at least) one willing individual to decide. In the case of mass media,
an individual that observes t − 2 revolts does not know how many willing individuals
decided to revolt, thus she can only be sure that the revolution will triumph if she revolts
and there are at least n − W + 1 individuals left to decide. While these considerations
are embedded in the second part of Proposition 3, the following example is aimed to
clarify the mechanism why social media promote revolutions more than mass media.
We consider the simple society of Fig. 1 in which there are n = 4 individuals, and three
of them are willing to overthrow the dictator (W = 3). We assume that the revolution
will be successful in this society if and only if at least three individuals decide to revolt
(t = 3). We then focus on the worst possible scenario and construct an equilibrium
in which everyone stays at home under mass media. We show that there is a unique
equilibrium where all willing individuals revolt in the case of social media.
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Example 1 Consider the case of n = 4, W = 3, t = 3.16 When a communication
technology exists, the optimal decision of a willing individual in the last position
is obvious. If she observes two people revolting (ρ4 = 2), then she revolts and the
revolution triumphs. Otherwise she stays at home. The same is true for a willing
individual in position 3 if ρ3 = 2 (she best responds by revolting). As a consequence,
a willing citizen in position 2 observing one revolting individual (ρ2 = 1) revolts as
well, because she anticipates that if she decides to revolt, then the last willing individual
(either in position 3 or 4) will follow suit. Thus, in any equilibrium a willing citizen
revolts when ρ4 = 2; ρ3 = 2 or ρ2 = 1, and stays at home when ρ4 ∈ {0, 1} or
ρ3 = 0. In these last cases, a willing individual knows that the revolution is doomed
to fail, so she does not join. Thus, we are left with the following information sets for
which a willing citizen’s optimal action is not clear: ρ1; ρ2 = 0 and ρ3 = 1. In words,
we do not know yet what a willing citizen does when she is the first to decide; when
she is in the second position and observes no protester and when third in the sequence
of decision and observes one protester. We show an equilibrium for the case of mass
media where nobody revolts on the equilibrium path for some payoffs. Then, we show
that it cannot be the case for social media.
Assume the existence of mass media and the following payoffs: uw,r,R = 1, uw,s =
0 and uw,r,F = −10, that satisfy uw,r,R > uw,s > uw,r,F . If nobody chooses to revolt
in the previous information sets (ρ1; ρ2 = 0 and ρ3 = 1) and acts optimally at the
other information sets (i.e., revolts when ρ4 = 2; ρ3 = 2 or ρ2 = 1, and stays at home
when ρ4 ∈ {0, 1} or ρ3 = 0) then, we end up in an equilibrium without revolution. To
show that nobody has a profitable unilateral deviation, take the first individual. Her
deviation consists in revolting instead of staying at home. This is profitable if the second
individual is willing, because the first individual induces the second one to revolt as
well by the arguments we have seen before. In this case, the revolution triumphs and
the highest utility is obtained. When the second individual is unwilling (which has
conditional probability 13 ), then the proposed strategies imply that subsequent willing
individuals will stay at home and the revolution fails. Therefore, the unilateral deviation
is not profitable if and only if
uw,s >
2
3
uw,r,R + 13uw,r,F ,
which holds for the proposed payoffs. In the same vein, it is easy to check that if
a willing individual in position 2 observes that nobody has revolted yet (ρ2 = 0),
then she does not have a profitable unilateral deviation given the prescribed strategy.
Consider now a willing individual in position 3 who observes that just one citizen
has revolted (ρ3 = 1). According to the prescribed strategy, it is an off-equilibrium
decision. Thus, consistent beliefs may include that a willing individual followed the
strategy and one willing individual deviated and revolted. Those beliefs imply that
she will be followed by the unwilling citizen. Along these lines, it is the inability of a
16 It follows from Proposition 1 that without any communication technology, there are two symmetric
equilibria (in pure strategies). In one of them, the three willing individuals choose to revolt. In the other
one, they choose to stay at home. This is the case because for a willing individual to revolt (stay at home)
is the best response when she believes that the other willing individuals choose to revolt (stay at home).
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willing individual in position 3 to distinguish whether the first or the second individual
stayed at home (and her pessimism) that makes it optimal for the willing individual
in position 1 to stay at home. Note also that the equilibrium in which each willing
individual participates exists if we simply consider a strategy profile that establishes
that willing individuals should revolt when ρ1; ρ2 = 0 and ρ3 = 1.
Restrictions on off-the-equilibrium beliefs could eliminate the equilibrium in which
citizens do not revolt. For instance, assume that the first individuals to decide were
willing ones with certainty, so that the type vector is (w,w,w, x). In this case it is
profitable to deviate unilaterally from staying at home when a willing individual is the
first to decide as given the best responses indicated above the revolution will triumph.
In fact, our result suggests that repressive regimes may attempt actively to increase
uncertainty about the public discontent (even in the form to hinder citizens to have
detailed information about participation in protests) so that multiple equilibria, and
hence potentially no protests remains an equilibrium.
Next, we show that under social media there is a unique equilibrium in which
all willing individuals revolt and succeed in overthrowing the dictator. For a willing
individual in the last position the previous arguments apply. Thus, upon observing
that two other citizens have revolted (the order does not matter) she revolts as well,
otherwise she stays at home. When in position 3, a willing individual joins the protest
when observing two protesters. As a consequence, a willing individual in the second
position, who observes that the first citizen decided to protest, will revolt as well,
anticipating that the last willing individual (either in position 3 or 4) will join the
protests as well.
As a next step, let us consider what happens if a willing citizen observes that
the first citizen revolted, whereas the second one stayed at home. We denote this by
(r, s). By previous reasoning this individual can be sure that the second individual
was the unwilling one (a willing individual in the second position would have joined
the uprising upon observing that the first citizen revolted), so she knows that the
last citizen is willing and anticipating her reaction to observing a history with two
individuals revolting she decides to protest as well.
Given the previous argument, a willing individual in the first position chooses
optimally to protest, since any history starting with a revolting citizen leads to a
successful revolution (either if she is followed by a willing individual who protests
herself or when followed by an unwilling one who stays at home, but then the next
individual will join the protest and in any case the last willing individual will revolt as
well). As a consequence, when observing that the first individual has stayed at home,
willing citizens know that she must have been the unwilling one (i.e., individuals get
to know that the type vector is (x, w,w,w) and by backward induction they play the
unique equilibrium in which all of them revolt). That is, since the willing individual in
position 4 (3) revolts when observing two (one) previous revolts, the willing citizen in
position 2 will revolt and thus the revolution triumphs, and the dictator is overthrown.
Importantly, these arguments apply for any payoffs such that uw,r,R > uw,s > uw,r,F .
It is also worth noting that with social media the outcome is unique because individuals
are able to distinguish the histories (r, s) and (s, r), while with mass media individuals
may believe that (with some positive probability) the one who stayed at home is a
willing individual.
123
Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach. . .
Proposition 3 establishes also a relationship between the threshold t and the number
of willing individuals in the society W such that it is possible to construct an equi-
librium where the revolution does not triumph in the presence of mass media. In the
following example, we show the quantitative difference in the effectiveness of social
media versus mass media in fostering revolutions. In particular, Example 2 shows that
all willing citizens revolting can be achieved as an equilibrium with mass media only
if a relatively low proportion of the society is required to overthrow the dictator.
Example 2 Consider the case of n = 10, W = 7, t = 5. Our reasoning above implies
that the revolution triumphs under social media. Mass media can also foment rev-
olutions for any possible payoffs, but only if just a relatively low proportion of the
society is required to participate in the revolution in order to overthrow the dicta-
tor. In particular, Proposition 3 states that the revolution succeeds for sure only if
integer
[
n
n−W+1
] + 1 = 3 or less individuals are required to participate in the revolts.
Since it is required that t = 5 individuals revolt, it is possible that nobody revolts
under mass media, even though more than two-thirds of the individuals are willing to
overthrow the dictator in this society (W = 7).17
The intuition behind this result is the following. If an individual can be sure that
the revolution succeeds, then she joins the protests. Whenever she may believe that
with positive probability the revolution fails, it is possible to find a punishment that
is sufficiently large to deter individuals from participating in the protests. A willing
individual at position 7, 8, 9 or 10 cannot be sure that among the subsequent citizens
there is a willing one, since possibly all of them are unwilling. Hence, if she revolts,
in the worst case the number of participants increases only by 1. Thus, a willing
individual at these positions only revolts if she observes at least t −1 previous revolts.
That is, she revolts if only one more revolting individual is needed to bring the uprising
to triumph. At position 6, a willing individual knows that there is for sure one more
willing individual behind her and she can convince her to revolt with certainty if she
will observe t −1 revolts. Thus, the willing citizen at position 6 revolts if she observes
t − 2 revolts. A willing individual at position 5 knows that there are at least two
willing citizens behind her, but she cannot make sure that both of them will revolt if
she decides to revolt. This is the case because possibly the first of the willing individuals
is at position 9 and then by previous arguments this citizen cannot be sure that there is
another willing individual behind her. Hence, a willing citizen at position 5 knows that
by revolting she can prompt for sure one more willing individual to participate, so she
revolts if she observes t −2 revolts. The same reasoning applies to willing individuals
at position 4 and 3. A willing individual at position 2 knows that there are at least
5 willing individuals behind her. In the worst case, the next one is at position 6 and
by previous reasoning even she knows that there is one more willing citizen behind
her. So, at position 2 a willing individual knows that she can induce two more willing
citizens. Hence, if she observes that t − 3 individuals have already revolted, then she
joins the protest. The same is true for a willing individual at position 1. Note that a
17 The difference becomes larger if we scale up the numbers. If n = 100 and W = 70 then the revolution
succeeds always with social media (for any t ≤ W ), while the protest triumphs with mass media only if
t ≤ 4 individuals are required to join.
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willing individual at position 1 cannot observe anybody revolting, so the threshold that
enables a successful revolution is 3 or less citizens. Probably, the unwilling individuals
are at the first 3 positions. However, rational actors understanding the game infer, that
if with a threshold of 3 none of the first 2 citizens revolted, then it must be due to the
fact that those individuals were unwilling. But it reveals at the same time, that there
are enough willing individuals behind, so a willing individual at position 3 (or 4) will
revolt. Note that with a threshold of 3 (or less) all willing individuals will revolt by
the previous arguments.
With higher thresholds, the revolution may fail. In particular, suppose that payoffs
are uw,r,R = 1, uw,s = 0, uw,r,F = −10100 and t = 4. Hence, the dictator would
punish very strongly (say, execute) the participants of a failed revolution. Consider
the following strategy for willing individuals
σ¯i (ϕi ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
r if
⎧
⎨
⎩
ρi = 3, ∀i
ρi = 2, ∀i ≤ 6
ρi = 1, ∀i ≤ 2
s otherwise
where ρi is the number of participants that have chosen r before individual i . A willing
individual revolts at the information sets specified above. We have to prove that the
strategy is optimal in the rest of information sets. Because a willing individual at
position 1 observes nobody revolting, the proposed strategy profile states that she
should stay at home. What if she deviates? Conditional on the first individual being
willing, the probability that the second citizen is willing too is 6 out of 9. Thus, with
probability 23 the deviation is successful and if the subsequent citizens follow the above
strategy, then the revolution triumphs. However, with probability 13 the next citizen is
unwilling and she will stay at home. Then, if the subsequent willing individuals act
according to the proposed strategy, the revolution fails. Given the payoffs it is easy
to calculate that the expected utility of a willing individual in position 1 is negative,
so the deviation is not profitable. The same argument can be applied for the rest of
information sets to show that no deviation is profitable.
In our example, mass media communication guarantees that the revolt succeeds
only if t ≤ 3 individuals’ participation is necessary to overthrow the dictator. To get
an idea how our results affect mobilization, we scale up the numbers. In a society of
100 individuals in which 51 people are required to participate in the protests to change
the regime, mass media facilitate a successful revolution (with all willing individuals
revolting) for any payoffs only if it is known that all individuals (W = 100) are in favor
of the revolution. If the required threshold were t = 49, mass media would guarantee
that the revolution succeeds only if it was commonly known that at least W = 99
individuals are of the willing type. With social media, both W = 51 and W = 49
ensure that the revolt triumphs, respectively. Thus, mass media lead to a successful
revolution only if there is a huge amount of people willing to participate in the protests,
or if the dictator is very weak (the threshold is very low). In any other case, the dictator
could implement a sufficiently high punishment (uw,r,F ) so that revolts may not occur
in equilibrium.
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5 Discussion
This paper has attempted to show that differences between the information transmitted
by mass and social media can result in different outcomes in mobilization. Our research
was prompted by the lack of a formal model that captures the importance of social
media in mobilization during recent revolts. We argue that a potential channel for
the success of the protests is that social media (e.g., Twitter or Facebook) provide
a more detailed structure of information than mass media (e.g., TV or radio). More
precisely, our model relies on the assumption that the exact history of past events
can be followed using social media. Mass media provide also information about past
decisions, but only in aggregate terms.
Theoretically, when the willingness to revolt is private information, our assump-
tions lead to a unique equilibrium with social media, where all discontented citizens
revolt and the dictator is overthrown, while multiple equilibria occur with mass media,
in one of them nobody revolts and the dictator remains in power. Our contribution to
the existing literature is then to show rigorously that there is a qualitative difference
between mass and social media in mobilization, the latter being able to promote mobi-
lization more efficiently.
Our model uses numerous assumptions and simplifications that help tractability, but
reduce its realism. Eventually, a lot of past decisions can be observed in any of the two
communication technologies. Although this assumption is demanding, it has been used
in Lohmann (1993, 1994a, b), who addresses questions of information aggregation and
political action. In her models, individuals observe previous actions, but she does not
study how different communication technologies affect coordination. In our setting, it
is hard to believe that any individual is able to know exactly how many other individuals
have joined the revolution through mass or social media; e.g., not all previous actions
are observable through social media, since not everybody uses Facebook or Twitter.
In addition, individuals may be biased when acquiring information online due to
self-confirmation and polarization (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011). In that regard, the
assumption that the exact history of decisions has to be observed for the revolution
to triumph can be relaxed. If there are enough willing individuals connected through
social media (and this is common information), then all willing individuals will revolt
and overthrow the dictator. We do not require that all previous decisions are observed
to have a unique equilibrium in which the individuals revolt. If a group of citizens
is connected through social media they will play a sequential game by observing
the exact history of choices. Proposition 3 argues that the “identification of types” is
possible in this setting. If this group of connected citizens contains at least t willing
individuals, then they will revolt in equilibrium and the revolution will triumph even if
not all individuals are connected. Because types might be private information, we need
a condition that guarantees that all citizens know that at least t willing individuals will
be connected. For example, when N = 100, t = 25, W = 50, we do not require all the
100 citizens to be connected through social media but it is enough if 75 citizens are
connected. These findings resemble the idea of cliques that guarantee coordination
(Chwe 2000). One other way to relax the assumption that all individuals have to
observe each other is to model a coordination problem among groups. Our findings
could then be interpreted in terms of requiring that some groups in the society observe
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the action of others and coordinate. For instance, in Egypt several groups (e.g., Muslim
Brotherhood, April 6 Youth Movement, soccer ultras) tried to coordinate the moves
of their members for the mobilization to be successful. When applying our results to
the coordination of groups, it does not seem too onerous to suppose that these groups
know exactly what other groups are doing (e.g., Ginkel and Smith 1999; De Mesquita
2010; Barbera and Jackson 2016).
The other feature of our model that deserves some attention is the assumption that
there are enough willing individuals to revolt. Most of the Arab countries (see chapter
3 in Filiu 2011) had a rather educated youth that was hit hard by unemployment and
therefore in general was dissatisfied with the regime. Given the fact that the median
age in these countries is around or less than 30, the youth represented a sufficient
mass to change the system. Moreover, in some countries ethnic or religious minorities
(e.g. the Copts in Egypt) also supported such aims. Thus, the assumption that there are
enough willing individuals to overthrow the dictator (and this is common information)
does not seem demanding, but one possible extension of our model is to consider that
there is uncertainty about it. In such an alternative model, media might turn out to be
informative about the feasibility of the revolution.
One other aspect of our setup is the assumption that individuals choose in an exoge-
nously determined position. We are not aware of any paper that addresses this issue
but one could try to endogenize such a decision. In the presence of media, individ-
uals might want to postpone their decisions to get as much information as possible.
Arguably, willing individuals may also want to choose early in the presence of media so
as to signal their types and trigger the revolt, as discussed in De Mesquita (2010). The
fact that positions are exogenously determined in our setting implies that our model
is suitable for any possible sequence of decisions that could have been determined in
a pre-game, in which individuals decided when to make their decision.
The issue of commitment problems is also worth discussing. One illustration of
this problem would be supporting an event on Facebook, but not attending it. This
consideration is not possible in our setting as individuals decide only once and cannot
change their decision. In Egypt, page members took photos of themselves and posted
them as a way to confirm participation. Giving the face can be seen as a way to
overcome the commitment problem and rationalize our assumption, although we agree
with De Mesquita (2010) that accounting for commitment problems is a fruitful area
for future research.
A possibly even more severe issue is that media may be manipulated by the regime.
During recent revolts, this does not seem to have been an issue in some countries.
Filiu (2011) argues that for example in Egypt a relatively free press could evolve
(e.g. journal Al-Masry al-Yom, TV station Dream) and Al-Jazeera, a media outlet
with a high standard also broadcasts in many Arab countries. Thus, in principle,
citizens could have a more or less accurate view of the situation. We focus on how
the communication technology can favor revolts, and deliberately leave aside issues
of manipulation or information about the performance of the government. Enikolopov
et al. (2016) points out that fostering coordination by reducing its costs (which is
ultimately the benefit of social media) might be more important to the successful
protests than spreading information about the regime. We acknowledge, however, that
autocratic regimes are aware of the importance of media. They tend to restrict access
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to social media, cutting off access to Facebook or Twitter, possibly because regimes
fear the potential effects of further information. For instance, during the Arab spring
several times they just shut Internet down for days. Regimes also actively monitor
chats and forums and also develop fake websites to attract and identify potential
opponents (see chapter 4 in Filiu 2011 or Gunitsky 2015). In the light of our findings,
the dictator’s decision of controlling the Internet or limiting the access to information
and hence hindering coordination may receive some theoretical support. Along these
lines, allowing the government to control the information, to make concessions to the
protesters to appease them (Robinson and Acemoglu 2006) or taking into account
the performance of the government (e.g. if the economy is doing worse than in other
countries or if the inequality has risen) would help to enrich our setting. These issues
may be also relevant from a policy perspective; e.g., what is the information that
individuals should (not) receive for a revolt to triumph.18
Finally, we show in our setup that revolution is the unique equilibrium with social
media. However, the mere existence of social media is not enough to bring about a
regime change (see for instance, Dewey et al. 2012; Wolfsfeld et al. 2013). Although
the demonstrations organized through Facebook were extremely successful in Egypt
in January 2011, the April 6 Youth Movement failed to trigger mass protests using
social media in 2008 in the same country. Similarly, in 2011, in Syria the ‘days of rage”
protest was endorsed by 12,000 individuals online, but the turnout was low. Thus, there
are other economic factors such as the level of education or the lack of opportunities
that might help to explain why revolutions triumph (Campante and Chor 2012).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the differential effect of communication technologies
on the outcome of revolutions in which overthrowing the dictator is assumed to be the
socially efficient outcome. We distinguish mass and social media by the granularity of
information that they provide. In particular, mass media supply an aggregate piece of
information about the actual state of revolution, while when informed through social
media individuals know the precise sequence of decisions that led to the actual state.
When individuals’ types are public information, both communication technologies
enable a successful revolution with certainty, a result that does not hold without com-
munication technology. Hence, both mass and social media facilitate overthrowing the
dictator. When types are private information, the sort of communication technology
becomes relevant. With social media, the revolution succeeds in the unique equilib-
rium, whereas the revolution may fail with mass media except when the amount of
people required to succeed is sufficiently low. If the punishment for participating in a
failed revolution is sufficiently high, with mass media the no-revolution equilibrium
may be sustained, but it is not true for the social media technology. As a result, our
model shows that social media facilitate revolts more than mass media do.
18 Edmond (2013) analyzes in a different setup under which conditions a regime can be toppled if infor-
mation is manipulated. See Chen et al. (2016) for a model in which citizens share rumors about the strength
of the government and Pierskalla (2010) or Ginkel and Smith (1999) for a model in which the regime is an
active player.
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Albeit the current study is motivated by revolts, the underlying situation is a coor-
dination game with two types in which the uncertainty about types makes successful
coordination more difficult. Our finding that the granularity of the information about
previous decisions affects if the coordination is successful may be relevant in other
socioeconomic environments that share the features of our game.
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix A
Proposition 2 If type is public information, every willing individual revolts in any
subgame perfect equilibrium under both communication technologies.
Proof The existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed by standard arguments. We show
that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium each willing individual revolts.
Let αi = #{τ j = w : j ≤ i | τi = w, τ } be the position of a willing individual i
among the willing individuals in a given type vector (τ ). Note that αi ∈ {1, 2, . . . W },
with W > t and αi is observable because types are public information
By backward induction, the last willing individual (αi = W ) revolts if at least t −1
other willing individuals decided to revolt. This is because he number of protesters
reaches the threshold t if she follows suit; i.e., the revolution will be successful.
Otherwise, she decides to stay at home. The next to the last willing individual (αi =
W −1) revolts if at least t −2 willing predecessors chose to revolt anticipating that then
also the last willing individual will join in. Again, if the condition is not met, then she
stays at home. This argument can be repeated for all willing individuals: the individual
αi revolts if at least t − (W − αi + 1) other individuals decided to revolt, otherwise
she prefers to stay at home. As a consequence, the first willing individual (αi = 1)
revolts even if she does not observe anybody revolting (t − W < 0). Therefore, the
revolution succeeds.
Notice that the previous argument to find the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
works for both types of communication technology mass and social media, thus Propo-
sition 2 holds. unionsq
Appendix B
Proposition 3 Consider the case where types are private information. Under the social
media technology, the revolution always succeeds because each willing individual
revolts in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under the mass media technology,
• if t < [ n
n−W+1
] + 1, each willing individual revolts and the revolution succeeds;
• if t ≥ [ n
n−W+1
] + 1, there are equilibria where the revolution is unsuccessful and
nobody revolts for certain values of uw,r,R; uw,s and uw,r,F .
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Proof Social media
Let a history hi = {a1, a2, . . . , ai−1} be the set of actions chosen by predecessors
of i . In the social media case, individual i knows hi when she decides whether or not
to revolt. Let ai,∗ be a set of actions for each individual k > i , such that action ak
of each individual k is a best response conditional on hi+1 = {hi , ai }, actions of its
predecessors (i + 1, . . . , k − 1) according to ai,∗ and some consistent beliefs. Let π j
be the payoff of j given a profile of actions.
We define a truthful history as the one in which a willing individual j < i strictly
prefers to revolt in the information sets where it is observed that the individual stays
at home (conditional on any possible best response by the individuals after j and
consistent beliefs), that is,
Definition 1 A history hi is truthful if and only if π j (r |τ j = w, h j ∈ hi , a j,∗) >
π j (s|τ j = w, h j ∈ hi , a j,∗), ∀a j,∗,∀ j < i : a j = s.
We denote by Htr (k) the set of truthful histories which contain k revolts at any
position i − 1 ≥ k.19 Truthful histories are those for which actions reveal the type,
so anyone can make sure that only unwilling citizens stayed at home and the willing
ones revolted. In a truthful history, consistent beliefs assign probability 0 to any type
vector in which a willing individual would choose “stay at home” according to the
history.
Lemma 1 If πi (r |τi = w, hi ∈ Htr (k), ai,∗) > πi (s|τi = w, hi ∈ Htr (k), ai,∗),∀k
> kˆ, then πi (r |τi = w, hi ∈ Htr (kˆ), ai,∗) > πi (s|τi = w, hi ∈ Htr (kˆ), ai,∗).
Proof The lemma assumes that when a truthful history containing more than kˆ revolts
is reached, for any possible continuation vector subsequent willing individuals will
revolt. If it is the case, note that the only optimal strategy when observing a truthful
history with kˆ revolts is to revolt if willing. If a willing individual observes htr (kˆ) ∈
Htr (kˆ), then by revolting she generates a history which belongs to Htr (kˆ + 1) and
by assumption, all subsequent willing citizens will revolt, so the revolution triumphs.
Given such a history the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy is to be truthful,
since there is no unilateral profitable deviation. unionsq
Note that if we can prove that πi (r |τi = w, hi ∈ Htr (k), ai,∗) > πi (r |τi = s, hi ∈
Htr (k), ai,∗),∀k > kˆ, for some kˆ, by induction and applying Lemma (1) recursively,
a willing individual chooses to revolt in any best response ∀k′ ≤ kˆ. It is obvious that
if a willing individual observes an element in Htr (x) where x ≥ t − 1, then she will
revolt and the revolution triumphs. As a consequence, a willing individual revolts in
any truthful history. Note that the first individual who decides is in a truthful history (in
fact, any individual who decides without observing any individual who stays at home is
trivially in a truthful history). Therefore under social media, in any equilibrium the first
individual reveals her type with her action, and so do all the subsequent individuals.
Therefore, under the social media technology, the revolution always succeeds
because each willing individual revolts in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
19 Clearly, any history with more than n − W “stayings at home” cannot be truthful.
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In order to prove the mass media case, we look for the worst conditions. We consider
an extremely low payoff for the case when the revolt does not succeed showing that
in this situation, for any positive probability of not having enough willing followers
who will revolt, the willing individual will stay at home. We look for the conditions
that guarantee that even in the worst case, willing individuals revolt. It proves the
conditions under which mass media is sufficient for a successful revolution.
Case 1: t <
[
n
n−W+1
] + 1.
We split the sequence of individuals into groups with n − W + 1 individuals in
each one and a last group with the reamining individual. Let gi denote each of those
groups and
{
g1, g2, . . . , gt , . . . , ginteger
[
n
n−W+1
]
}
the sequence of groups. Note that
each group gi includes at least 1 willing individual with probability 1. All the willing
individuals in group gt revolt if they observe t − 1 individuals revolting. For any
possible beliefs, individuals in group gt−1 revolt if they observe t − 2 individuals
revolting, and by backward induction willing individuals in the group gt−k revolt if
they observe at least t − k − 1 individuals who revolt. Therefore, all the individuals
revolt in any Bayesian equilibrium.
Case 2: t ≥ [ n
n−W+1
] + 1.
We prove that in this circumstance, the following strategy where willing individuals
do not revolt over the equilibrium path is a Bayesian equilibrium, with adequate beliefs,
for adequate payoffs:
σi =
{
r i f integer
[
n−i
n−W+1
]
≥ t − 1 − {#a j = r : j < i},
s in other case
where the individual i is in the i-th position in the sequence of decision.
The equilibrium where all the willing individuals revolt always exists.
We prove the existence of an equilibrium where nobody revolts. According to
the strategy, if the first individual was a willing, she should stay at home as should
all the subsequent individuals. In any consistent beliefs, revolting people are willing
individuals with probability 1. For the individuals who do not revolt, according to the
strategy, they could be willings as well as unwillings. In the equilibrium beliefs that we
construct, the individual assigns a positive probability p¯ to having min{i − 1, W − 1}
willing predecessors. Under this belief, the individual is followed by a maximum of
W −i willings among her n−i successors. Note that under this belief, there is a positive
probability of the first willing successor deciding in position min{∞, n − (W − i)},
where ∞ represents the case where it is believed that there is no willing follower. If
there is no willing follower, to stay at home is optimal and there is no optimal deviation.
If there are willing successors, let be p˘ the (strictly positive) probability of the first
willing follower being in position n − (W − i). According to the described strategy,
note that the willing individual in position n − (W − i) would stay at home even if the
individual i revolts. Therefore given that there is a (strictly) positive probability of the
revolt being unsuccessful after revolting by the individual i, for a payoff of a failed
revolt sufficiently low, there is no optimal deviation of staying at home. Therefore, the
strategy allow for consistent beliefs that define a Bayesian equilibrium. unionsq
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Fig. 2 Decision tree of the
social media case in example
with n = 4 and W = 3
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Appendix C
Figure 2 represents the complete decision tree for the case of social media. Individuals
are able to distinguish the sequence of actions but they do not know the type vector.
For simplicity, the information nodes that belong to the same information set for
individuals in position 3 and 4 have been marked with the same geometrical shape.
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